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Abstract
Although post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
traumatic brain injury (TBI) are categorized as sep-
arate and discrete disorders, the boundary between
them is sometimes indistinct.  Their separation is
based on the assumption that PTSD results primar-
ily from psychological stress, while TBI is the conse-
quence of an identifiable injury to the brain.  This dis-
tinction is based on an antiquated polarity between
mind and brain, and the separation of the two disor-
ders often becomes arbitrary in day-to-day psychi-
atric practice and research.
This issue of Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience is
titled “Trauma, Brain Injury, and Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder.” The articles between its covers
address both post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
and traumatic brain injury (TBI). As the combina-
tion of these articles indicates, the various recent
wars in the Middle East have awakened an old con-
troversy about the relative impact of physical and
psychological stress in causing neuropsychiatric dis-
orders. Although the term TBI suggests the occur-
rence of some type of physical lesion, while PTSD
suggests a disorder occurring as a consequence of
psychological stress, the boundary between the two
is often unclear and sometimes permeable or over-
lapping.
The first systematic discussion of the relationship
between physical and psychological stress dates
back to World War I. The history of that discussion
provides an informative context for current contro-
versies concerning PTSD and TBI.
1 Combat tech-
niques in World War I introduced new types of com-
bat stress that had not existed during previous wars.
Soldiers engaged in trench warfare were relatively
immobile and therefore more vulnerable. They were
also chronically exposed to new and perversely
lethal threats, such as poison gas, machine gun fire,
mortar attacks, land mines, and tanks. Casualties
were devastating, and fatality rates were frighten-
ing. Men watched their friends die beside them, and
they confronted the possibility of their own demise
on a daily basis. Alternatively they might be maimed
and consigned to a life of chronic disability. As the
war progressed, the high casualty rate made it clear
that Britain and continental European countries
were losing many of an entire generation of young
men—a social loss from which they would be slow
to recover. This sense of futility and despair was elo-
quently expressed by British war poets such as
Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon:
Earth's wheels run oiled with blood. Forget we that.
Let us lie down and dig ourselves in thought.
Beauty is yours and you have mastery,
Wisdom is mine, and I have mystery.
We two will stay behind and keep our troth.
Let us forego men's minds that are brute's natures,
Let us not sup the blood which some say nurtures,
Be we not swift with swiftness of the tigress.
Let us break ranks from those who trek from progress.
Miss we the march of this retreating world
Into old citadels that are not walled.
Let us lie out and hold the open truth.
Then when their blood hath clogged the chariot wheels
We will go up and wash them from deep wells.
What though we sink from men as pitchers falling
Many shall raise us up to be their filling
Even from wells we sunk too deep for war
Even as one who bled where no wounds were.
Wilfred Owen
Strange Meeting
Project Gutenberg Etext of Poems by Wilfred Owen
In this context of brutal bloodshed and omnipresent
fear, a new and somewhat unfamiliar type of dis-
ability emerged that had not been described in pre-
vious wars: a syndrome characterized by confusion,
memory impairment, headache, difficulty concen-
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trating, tremor, and sensitivity to loud noises. This
was initially assumed to be due to exposure to explo-
sions, leading to concussions of the brain (“commo-
tion cerebri”) in the absence of visible signs of exter-
nal head trauma, and the disorder began to be
referred to as “shell shock.” Postmortem examina-
tion of two cases revealed a variety of abnormalities,
particularly vascular damage and congestion.
2As the
war progressed, the number of shell shock casualties
grew alarmingly. 
By mid-war, however, it was observed that some sol-
diers presenting with the symptoms of shell shock
did not have any evidence of exposure to explo-
sions. This puzzling paradox—a concussion-like syn-
drome in the absence of documentable head
trauma—challenged the explanatory powers of con-
temporary medicine, particularly in an era when no
tools were available to explore the living brain non-
invasively. Ultimately this paradox led to the intro-
duction of a distinction between a neuras-
thenic/emotional/”nervous” condition and a more
physically based one caused by a specific explosion
exposure. During subsequent years multiple schol-
arly attempts were made to determine whether
these two conditions represented discrete disorders
or syndromes and whether clear boundaries could
be set to distinguish between them.
3-6
This debate was paralleled by the rise of two com-
peting traditions within neuropsychiatry: biological
vs psychodynamic explanations for the develop-
ment of disorders. Within the biological tradition
one important perspective (particularly relevant to
the etiological debate and remarkably prescient of
future developments) was presented by Selye, who
coined the term “stress” and hypothesized that it
was mediated by the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal (HPA) axis.
7 He described the General
Adaptation Syndrome as a response to stress and
considered the traumatic neuroses to be a conse-
quence of chronic or severe stress. Walter Cannon
also proposed a related physiological basis for fear
responses in his description of the “fight or flight”
syndrome.
8 A second important perspective was
provided by the psychodynamic tradition, which
developed an extensive explanatory system that
could account for the role of psychological factors
in producing symptoms and in developing both
healthy and unhealthy coping mechanisms.
9
This debate, and the perspectives provided by the
competing traditions, had a significant impact on
policy decisions. This distinction was invoked in
making decisions about the grounds for determin-
ing disability both during and after combat, and it
was also significant for determining criteria for
awarding pensions.
6,10,11Veterans from World War I
were eligible for pensions as a consequence of suf-
fering from shell shock, but concerns were raised
about the large number of recipients and the possi-
bility of malingering. As World War II loomed in the
future and then occurred, British policy created
strict criteria for recognizing and awarding disabil-
ities secondary to shell shock/stress/neurasthenia—
all in the direction of minimizing or eliminating any
rewards for disabilities considered to be psy-
chogenic.
10
After the end of World War II, American psychia-
try decided to create a standard nomenclature that
would be used by all psychiatrists; the impetus came
initially from the Veterans’ Administration and was
influenced by the World War II experience, which
required that psychiatrists from across the United
States and from diverse training backgrounds
develop a common language for discussing psy-
chopathology, making diagnoses, and determining
disability. This led to the formulation of a diagnos-
tic category called Gross Stress Reaction, which
appeared in the first Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual (DSM-I), published in 1952. Its description
emphasized that the disorder was a reaction to a
great or unusual stressor that invoked overwhelm-
ing fear in a normal personality. It emphasized that
the disorder was transient and reversible; if the
symptoms persisted, another diagnosis was to be
given. Thus the definition was more influenced by
the psychodynamic traditions that prevailed at the
time than by biological models, and it did not lend
itself to making frequent diagnoses of service-con-
nected disabilities in the post-World War II era.
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Thereafter the diagnosis went into oblivion. Since it
was closely linked to the history of warfare, it was
completely omitted from DSM-II, published in
1968—23 years after the last Great War and during
a period of relative peace.
When the DSM-IIITask Force was assembled in the
early 1970s, one of the tasks that it confronted was
to decide whether the diagnosis of Gross Stress
Reaction should be reinstated in the DSM noso-
logical system. The Vietnam War was winding down
and had been very unpopular. Unfortunately, the
general public was not able to distinguish between
the war and the people that our country had drafted
to fight in it, and so Vietnam veterans quite under-
standably felt defensive, undervalued, and angry. A
small but militant subgroup of Vietnam veterans
clamored for the introduction of a diagnosis that
would recognize the potential consequences of
experiencing the stress of combat, and that might
perhaps provide disability and treatment benefits
for the psychiatric disorder that combat stress
induced. Bob Spitzer, the Task Force chair, asked
me to deal with the problem; he knew that I was
hard-working and intellectually agile; but he did not
know that I was actually already an expert on the
topic of stress-induced neuropsychiatric disorders. I
began my psychiatry career by studying the physi-
cal and mental consequences of one of the most
horrible stresses that human beings can experience:
suffering severe burn injuries. Within this model of
stress, I had already examined brain abnormalities
using electroencephalography, the pattern of acute
and chronic symptoms, the long-term outcome and
its predictors, and the role of coping mechanisms.
12-16
I was also well aware of the extensive research that
had been done to identify symptom patterns that
arise as a consequence of exposure to a wide vari-
ety of stressors, ranging from natural disasters to
death camps to military combat. 
The answer to the veterans’ request was obvious to
me: there is a well-established syndrome, defined by
a characteristic set of physiological (autonomic) and
cognitive and emotional symptoms, that occurs after
exposure to severe physical and emotional stress. In
fact, its scientific basis was as strong as that available
for disorders such as depression or even schizo-
phrenia. To call it “post-Vietnam-syndrome” (the
name chosen by the veteran advocacy groups)
would demean its well-established validity and nar-
row its range excessively. It would be best to call it
“Post-traumatic stress disorder.” I wrote the defini-
tion of PTSD for DSM-III based on my recognition
that a variety of stressors can induce a final com-
mon pathway that is expressed by a variety of auto-
nomic/physiologic, cognitive, and emotional symp-
toms that occur in response to a severe stressor.
Because I knew from my research with burn
patients that individuals with prior disabilities (eg,
epilepsy, abuse of alcohol or illegal drugs, depres-
sion) were more vulnerable to developing PTSD, I
threw out the requirement that the symptoms had
to arise in a previously normal individual. This
opened the gate a bit, as compared with the defini-
tion for Gross Stress Reaction. But I also narrowed
the gate by requiring that the stressor—the actual
etiological factor—had to be “outside the range of
normal human experience” in order to avoid the
risk of overdiagnosis.
Once the diagnosis of PTSD became available after
the publication of DSM-III in 1980, it quickly
enjoyed widespread use, often in ways that were not
anticipated. The genie was out of the bottle and
began to actively intervene in psychiatric practice
and research. Although the precipitating stressor was
supposed to be “outside the range of normal human
experience,” and was conceptualized with death
camps and life-threatening combat experiences as a
model, this concept was steadily broadened. The
recognition that the response to the stressor might
be delayed (largely because it is maladaptive within
the context of combat) was also broadened in unan-
ticipated ways: for example, the diagnosis became
widely used for adults who described themselves as
being abused by their parents when young children.
Subsequent revisions of DSM adapted to these
applications by steadily broadening the definition of
the stressor and modifying its relationship to the
onset of the disorder in a variety of ways.
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Since the introduction of the concept of PTSD into
psychiatric nomenclature in 1980, the controversy
between the role of biological and psychological fac-
tors has re-emerged. The maturation of the discipline
of neuroscience, which is now widely perceived as the
“basic science of psychiatry,” has had a significant
influence. The development of the tools of neu-
roimaging has provided an opportunity to conduct in
vivo exploration of the brain in individuals who are
diagnosed as suffering from PTSD. And the neu-
ropsychiatric casualties of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, who have been exposed to new combat
techniques and new types of combat stress much as
occurred during World War I, have reawakened the
controversy about the relationship between physical
and psychological injuries. Terrorism, guerilla warfare,
and patrols confronting IEDs (improvised explosive
devices) and land mines have replaced the mortars
and trench warfare of World War I. TBI has been
called the “signature injury” for these wars, much as
shell shock was during World War I. And the same
policy issues concerning provision of pensions and
health care for veterans are the subject of concern
and debate, and they are informed by the same con-
troversy about “physical” vs “emotional” injuries;
these have been the subject of three Institute of
Medicine reports written to clarify diagnostic, treat-
ment, and compensation issues.
17-19
What is PTSD? And how is it related to TBI? There
are still no easy answers to these questions. This
issue of Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience makes a
significant and useful contribution to addressing
them. It makes it clear that the disorders have many
overlapping features, both symptomatically and bio-
logically. It highlights the progress that has been
made in understanding the underlying biology of
both disorders by using the tools of neuroscience
and neuroimaging. And this progress makes it clear
that the old polarity between physical vs emotional
underpinnings for PTSD is an antiquated way of
thinking that is no longer useful in the 21st century.
Whatever PTSD is, it is a disorder that cannot be
dismissed as purely psychological or a refuge for
malingerers. As this issue illustrates, psychological
trauma has neurobiological effects, and these effects
can now be visualized and measured in the living
brain. To some extent, the legacy of the World War I
controversy has finally been resolved.
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